

Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality

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Epistemological disjunctivism (ED) is the thesis that, if one perceptually knows that p , then one has a rational support for p which is factive and reflectively accessible. With some plausible assumptions, ED allows us to say that one's perception yields rationally grounded knowledge that one is not massively mistaken about one's environment - which may seem to be a case of epistemic immodesty, hence a counterintuitive consequence of ED. In defense of ED, I claim that this consequence only seems to be counterintuitive under the supposition of a propositional view of rationality, according to which one is epistemically rational if and only if one has available propositional support for one's beliefs. In order to show that there is nothing problematic in claiming that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not massively mistaken, I turn to recent psychological and philosophical works on embodied views of cognition. I argue that to conceive of perceptual content as a function of the exercise of sensorimotor abilities suggests an embodied view of rationality (ER). ER is the key to dissolve the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, and it also holds some advantages over the propositional view of rationality, for (i) it allows us to ascribe rational states to individuals unable to assess the propositional bases for their beliefs as long as they aptly interact with their environment and (ii) it is in tune with an evolutionary view of rationality.