

**Relevance Differently Affects the Truth, Acceptability, and Probability Evaluations
of 'and', 'but', 'therefore', and 'if then'**

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According to the Frege-Grice tradition, differences in the meaning of 'and', 'but', and 'therefore' do not affect their truth conditions. In Experiment 1 we tested this assumption, along with the assumption that the truth conditions of 'if then' are not affected by relevance manipulations, employing a new version of the truth table task. In a follow up study, we tested for relevance effects on these target sentences in evaluations of probability and acceptability, employing a novel experimental task in which the participants supply rank orders of sentences according to their acceptability. A dissociation was found between evaluations of truth and acceptability/-probability: The relevance manipulation did not affect the truth evaluation of 'and', 'but', and 'therefore' differentially, but it strongly affected evaluations of their probability and rank ordered acceptability. Moreover, it was found that neither the material implication, nor the influential de Finetti table, nor truth conditional inferentialism could account for the truth conditions of 'if then' across relevance levels.