

## **Individual Intentional Autonomy**

### **Questioning the Roots of the Collective Intentionality Debate**

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Many possible theories we could conceive of in collective intentionality are discarded before they are actually explicated, as they would clash with the notion of an autonomous agent as found in philosophy of action. I argue that this notion of autonomous agency seems problematic in the light of current developments in social psychology. I will take Bratman's theory as an example of the type of theorizing we find in collective intentionality, and show how his balance of practical reasoning fits badly to recent findings in social psychology.

In philosophy of action an intention has to be owned by the individual that is acting. With such a definition it is hard to conceive of a collective intention that is not taking the intentional power of one individual and puts it in "the hands of the other agent". It seems, however, that the concept of autonomy is conflated with the notion of ownership of an intention. It is argued that the judgment about how to act has to be authoritative, but what does this mean if the reasons for acting are inaccessible? I argue that, on the traditional account, we do not only want to initiate the action autonomously, but also want to do so based on reasons A and B and desires X and Y.

If social psychology shows us that we often mention reasons that, from a third person perspective, seem to be non-explanatory, this affects the idea of autonomous agency (in joint action). Therefore I argue that we should at least consider other possible theories in collective intentionality.